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1. INTRODUCTION
To give the police greater power than a magistrate is to take a long
step down the totalitarian path. Perhaps such a step is desirable to
cope with modem forms of lawlessness. But if it is taken, it should be
the deliberate choice of the people through a constitutional amend-
ment. Until the Fourth Amendment, which is closely allied with the
Fifth, is rewritten, the person and the effects of the individual are
beyond the reach of all government agencies until there are reason-
able grounds to believe (probable cause) that a criminal venture has
been launched or is about to be launched.
- Justice Douglas, Terry v. Ohio'
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
the citizenry with one of the most important protections against govern-
* David C. Behar, Florida International University B.A., University of Miami School of
Law J.D. 2012. I would like to thank Professor Zanita E. Fenton for her mentorship throughout
the publication process. Her advice and assistance was invaluable. I would also like to thank my
family for all of their love, support and encouragement. I could not have produced this piece
without them.
1. 392 U.S. 1, 38-39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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mental intrusion.2 Specifically, the Fourth Amendment provides that:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." 3
Despite the Fourth Amendment's simple wording, Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is anything but simple and consistent.' The Supreme
Court justices have conflicting views including whether the Fourth
Amendment requires warrants,' whether probable cause is a precondi-
tion to warrant issuance,' and whether the subjective intent of the officer
should have a role in the Fourth Amendment inquiry.7 To add to the
Fourth Amendment's complexity, the Court has also carved a vast
amount of exceptions to whether and when a warrant is required. These
exceptions include warrantless detainee searches, warrantless arrests,
warrantless searches incident to arrests, plain view seizures, searches
and seizures justified by exigent circumstances, searches by consent,
vehicle searches, container searches, inventory searches, searches at the
border, searches at sea, administrative searches, and searches where the
special needs of law enforcement make warrant requirements "impracti-
cable."' With all of these exceptions, one must wonder whether Fourth
Amendment protections are a rule or an exception itself.9
With all of these inconsistencies in mind, an interesting question is
whether a factual scenario may require "an exception to an exception."
For instance, what if the plain view doctrine enters a context that
extends police authority to an unanticipated level? The computer realm
is such a context and requires special attention. This paper proposes that
2. Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 75, 77 (1994).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757
(1994) ("Warrants are not required - unless they are. All searches and seizures must be grounded
in probable cause - but not on Tuesdays. And unlawfully seized evidence must be excluded
whenever five votes say so.").
5. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment) ("The Fourth Amendment does not by its terms require a prior warrant for searches and
seizures . . . ").
6. See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523 (1967) ("[A]ppellant argues ...
that warrants should issue only when the [government] inspector possesses probable cause
.... We disagree.").
7. See e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plurality opinion) (no
majority as to whether officer inadvertence is a requirement to plain-view seizure).
8. The Georgetown Univ. Law Center, Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 35 GEO. L.J.
ANN. REV. CRIM. PRoc. 37, 37-38 (2006).
9. See Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101 (2008) (discussing the
erosion of Fourth Amendment protections).
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officer inadvertence be a requirement to a valid computer plain view
seizure. In other words, if an officer intentionally deviates from warrant
requirements and finds incriminating digital evidence, the evidence must
be suppressed. To facilitate analysis, the paper will focus on the Tenth
Circuit's controversial holding in United States v. Carey"o where the
court excluded digital evidence where the officer deliberately violated
warrant requirements. The Carey holding should be the law with respect
to computer searches, essentially creating a "computer exception" to
plan view seizures. Given the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence incon-
sistencies, the Supreme Court has the ability to provide this "computer
exception" to plain view seizures and should do so.
Applying the traditional plain view doctrine to the computer realm
is dangerous because computer usage is widespread and computers hold
a vast amount of data. According to a 2007 U.S. Census Bureau study,
approximately 62 percent of households had a computer and approxi-
mately 55 percent of households had internet access as of 2003. The
number of households with internet access has grown to 62 percent as of
2007." Most people use computers for all of their private matters
whether paying bills, writing personal emails, or storing photos of loved
ones. With the increase in computer usage, if the Court applies its
relaxed Fourth Amendment requirements in this realm, the Court will be
providing the government with a snap shot of the citizenry's private life.
In Carey, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that
enough was enough and delivered a blow to police power in the realm of
computer searches. The Court in Carey invalidated a computer search
when the searching officer admitted that he intentionally deviated from a
warrant, which authorized the search of Carey's computer for "names,
telephone numbers, ledger receipts, addresses, and other documentary
evidence pertaining to the sale and distribution of controlled sub-
stances."" The officer initially searched Carey's computer for drug
related evidence. However he subsequently started to investigate for evi-
dence of child pornography." The officer found child pornography on
Carey's computer and seized the photos by transferring them onto a
floppy disk. The Government, opposing Carey's Motion to Suppress,
argued that the plain view doctrine authorized the warrantless seizure
even though the officer intentionally deviated from the original warrant
10. 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999).
11. Computer and Internet use in the United States: October 2007, U.S. Census Bureau,
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/computer/2007.html (Appendix Table A) (last
visited Jan. 14, 2011).
12. Carey, 172 F.3d at 1270.
13. Id. at 1271.
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requirement. 14 The court in Carey determined that the officer's intent
was counter to the Fourth Amendment's principles and suppressed the
evidence."
This note argues that the Carey holding should be the law when the
plain view doctrine is applied to the computer context. The note begins
by examining Fourth Amendment jurisprudence leading up to the Carey
decision. Part II examines the deterioration of Fourth Amendment pro-
tections focusing on the Court's flawed reasoning. Part III examines
the Carey decision in more detail. Part IV dispels criticisms of the Carey
decision, specifically that Carey deviated from precedent and that the
decision is dangerous. Part V briefly concludes.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
A. Warrant Requirement
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to gen-
erally require that, prior to a search, a warrant must be issued that specif-
ically describes the items to be searched and/or seized.16 Specifically
the Court has stated that it is a cardinal principle that "searches con-
ducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.""
Although warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence is one of the murkier areas of law." To illus-
trate the murkiness, some members of the Supreme Court believe that
the Fourth Amendment may not even require a warrant, but rather that
the Fourth Amendment merely requires that a search and/or seizure be
"reasonable."' 9 Specifically, in California v. Acevedo, Justice Scalia
states:
The Fourth Amendment does not by its terms require a prior warrant
for searches and seizures; it merely prohibits searches and seizures
that are "unreasonable." What it explicitly states regarding warrants
is by way of limitation upon their issuance rather than requirement of
14. Id. at 1272.
15. Id. at 1276.
16. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
17. Id. at 357.
18. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 583 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)
("I do not regard today's holding as some momentous departure [from Fourth Amendment
precedent], but rather as merely the continuation of an inconsistent jurisprudence that has been
with us for years.").
19. Id. at 581 ("The Fourth Amendment does not by its terms require a prior warrant for
searches and seizures; it merely prohibits searches and seizures that are 'unreasonable."').
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their use. For the warrant was a means of insulating officials from
personal liability assessed by colonial juries. An officer who searched
or seized without a warrant did so at his own risk; he would be liable
for trespass, including exemplary damages, unless the jury found that
his action was "reasonable." If, however, the officer acted pursuant to
a proper warrant, he would be absolutely immune. By restricting the
issuance of warrants, the Framers endeavored to preserve the jury's
role in regulating searches and seizures.2 0
In other words, Justice Scalia believes that warrants are merely issued to
protect the officers from liability, not to protect citizens from intrusion.
However, Justice Scalia concedes that "although the Fourth Amendment
does not explicitly impose the requirement of a warrant, it is of course
textually possible to consider that implicit within the requirement of rea-
sonableness."2 1 As such, the Supreme Court is in agreement that the
Fourth Amendment encompasses a warrant requirement subject to
"exceptions." 2
Some of the most common warrant exceptions include searches
incident to arrests, plain view seizures, vehicle searches, container
searches, and inventory searches.2 3 However, one of the exceptions the
government most often invokes is the "exigent circumstances" excep-
tion.24 Even though "it is a 'basic principle of Fourth Amendment law'
that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presump-
tively unreasonable,"25 there are certain circumstances where the "rea-
sonableness" standard of the Fourth Amendment may in fact dispel the
warrant requirement. 6 In other words, "warrants are generally required
to search a person's home or his person unless 'the exigencies of the
situation' make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the
warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment."27 An example of an exigent circumstance is a fireman or police
20. Id. at 581-82 (internal citations omitted).
21. Id. at 582.
22. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (Fourth Amendment imposes
presumptive warrant requirement); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948) (Fourth
Amendment requires warrant unless exception applies).
23. The Georgetown Univ. Law Center, supra note 8, at 37-38.
24. The Georgetown Univ. Law Center, supra note 8, at 72-83 (discussing the exception
generally).
25. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443 (1971)).
26. See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967) ("in determining
whether a particular inspection is reasonable-and thus in determining whether there is probable
cause to issue a warrant for that inspection-the need for the inspection must be weighed in terms
of these reasonable goals of code enforcement.").
27. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978) (citing McDonald v. United States, 335
U.S. 451, 456 (1948)).
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officer responding to a burning building and entering the structure.28
However, once the emergency ends, the need for a warrantless entry
disappears and the warrant requirement is supposedly instilled again.29
Although this is the general rule, the Supreme Court has determined the
length of "exigency" liberally. For example, in the fire context, the gov-
ernment can investigate the building after the flame has been extin-
guished to discover the source of the fire and "officials need no warrant
to remain in a building for a reasonable time to investigate the cause of a
blaze after it has been extinguished."3 0 If the warrantless entry into the
structure was constitutional, then the seizure of illegal items in the
dwelling is constitutional as well."
Another example of an exigent circumstance is the warrantless
entry onto private property for the purpose of preventing the imminent
destruction of evidence.32 In Ker v. California, undercover officers
observed the defendant, a person known to be trafficking marijuana,
contact another known drug dealer and the two went back to the defen-
dant's apartment.3 3 The officers then obtained a key to the apartment
from the building manager and entered the premises for the purposes of
making sure that no evidence was destroyed. 34 The officer noticed mari-
juana sitting on the kitchen table and placed the suspects under arrest.3 5
The officer also seized the marijuana.36 The Supreme Court held that
the warrantless entry into the premises was reasonable because of the
risk that the marijuana may in fact be destroyed." The Court empha-
sized that marijuana is easily destroyed and that the suspects may in fact
have been "onto" the investigation." As such, the Court deemed the
warrantless entry constitutional by relying on the exigent circumstances
exception of preventing the destruction of evidence.
In sum, although the general rule requires a search warrant, the
Supreme Court has carved so many exceptions to the warrant require-
ment, including the "exigent circumstances" exception, that search war-
28. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) ("A burning building clearly presents an
exigency of sufficient proportions to render a warrantless entry 'reasonable.' Indeed, it would defy
reason to suppose that firemen must secure a warrant or consent before entering a burning
structure to put out the blaze.").
29. Id. at 509-10.
30. Id. at 510.
31. Id.
32. See e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963)
33. Id. at 24-31.
34. Id. at 28.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 28-29.
37. Id. at 40.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 40-41.
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rants are seldom required. As is evident from the Ker decision, it is
fairly simple to consider a situation an exigent circumstance. The
officers in that case had probable cause to believe that the drugs were in
the home,4 0 but contrary to the Court's findings, there was not much
evidence that the drugs were in fact going to be destroyed. The officers
should have been required to obtain a search warrant from a magistrate,
especially when taking into account that the defendant's home was being
searched and the home is afforded the highest Fourth Amendment
protections.
B. Probable Cause
Just as the Supreme Court has relaxed the need for a warrant, in the
rare case where a warrant is required, the Court has also relaxed proba-
ble cause requirements.4 2 According to the Fourth Amendment's text, in
order for a court to issue a warrant, the government must have probable
cause that the items to be searched and/or seized are involved in criminal
activity.43 However, probable cause is not a clear cut determination, but
rather a probability." In Brinegar v. United States, the Court described
probable cause accordingly:
In dealing with probable cause ... as the very name implies, we deal
with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and
prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is
accordingly correlative to what must be proved.45
The widely accepted definition of probable cause is where "the facts and
circumstances within their [the officers'] knowledge and of which they
had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that" an offense has
been or is being committed.4 6 In other words, the standard is not one of
an officer, but rather a reasonable person observing the same facts as the
officer.47
Although the text of the Fourth Amendment explicitly states that
40. Id.
41. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-86 (1980) ("[T]he 'physical entry of the home is
the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed."' (quoting United
States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972))).
42. See e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (holding that that municipal health
and safety inspectors need not have probable cause in order for the court to issue a search warrant
authorizing dwelling inspections).
43. US CONST. amend. IV.
44. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
45. Id. at 175.
46. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
47. Id.
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"no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,"4 8 the Supreme Court
has held in certain circumstances that warrants may be issued when the
evidence suggests something less than the traditional definition of prob-
able cause.49 For instance, in Camara v. Municipal Court,5 o the Court
held that municipal health and safety inspectors need not have probable
cause in order for the court to issue a search warrant authorizing dwell-
ing inspections." The Court reasoned that in cases in which search war-
rants are required, probable cause is merely a standard establishing
reasonableness.52 The Court stated: "[T]o apply this standard [probable
cause], it is obviously necessary first to focus upon the governmental
interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitution-
ally protected interests of the private citizen."" In other words, the
Court in Camara dispelled the traditional probable cause standard and
simply substituted a balancing test that requires that the governmental
interest justify a search. 54 Applying this standard, the Camara Court
held that inspection programs aimed at securing city-wide compliance
with minimal physical standards for private property satisfy such a com-
pelling governmental interest that they are per se reasonable, satisfying
the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement.
The Court's reasoning in Camara is flawed for many reasons.
First, the Court arbitrarily changes the traditional definition of probable
cause to mean one of reasonableness by balancing governmental inter-
ests against citizen privacy intrusion. 56 The Court starts with the pre-
mise that "it is obviously necessary first to focus upon the governmental
interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitution-
ally protected interests of the private citizen."" In other words, the
Court makes the constitutional starting point from the government's per-
spective.5 ' However the Fourth Amendment protects the private citi-
zenry from government intrusion. 9 It would follow that the starting
point should be on the infringement of the citizen's privacy, not on the
48. US CONST. amend. IV.
49. See Barry Jeffrey Stem, Warrants Without Probable Cause, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 1385
(1994).
50. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
51. Id. at 534.
52. Id. ("[Iln cases in which the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant to search be
obtained, 'probable cause' is the standard by which a particular decision to search is tested against
the constitutional mandate of reasonableness.").
53. Id. at 534-35.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 535.
56. Id. at 534.
57. Id. at 534-35.
58. Id.
59. Winick, supra note 2, at 77.
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governmental interest. The Fourth Amendment was not enacted to sat-
isfy governmental interests, but rather to protect the citizens against such
interests.6 0 As such, the Court in Camara delivered one of the numerous
blows to Fourth Amendment protections by diluting the definition of
probable cause in the administrative search contexts.
Another example of the Supreme Court diluting the probable cause
requirement is the case of Terry v. Ohio.6 1 In Terry, a police officer
noticed two men on a sidewalk whom the officer thought were "casing"
out a jewelry store to rob it.6 2 The officer relied on his hunch and, act-
ing on his suspicions, he approached the men and asked them to identify
themselves.63 When the men mumbled something in response, the
officer pat the men down, felt a pistol on each, and removed the guns.6 4
The main issue at trial was whether the officer needed to have probable
cause in order for the pat down.65 The Court indicated that the officer's
suspicion was not enough to establish probable cause, but nonetheless
the search was deemed constitutional.6 6 Once again, the Court relied on
the "reasonableness" language in the Fourth Amendment to fashion a
flexible standard. 67 The Court determined that a somewhat diluted form
of probable cause can exist and labeled it as a "reasonable suspicion. "6
The test is whether a reasonable person in the officer's position would
have had the suspicion that the suspects were armed based on the facts
available.6 9 If the answer was yes, then the stop and frisk was constitu-
tional.70 A close look at the test's language indicates that it is merely a
watered down version of traditional probable cause. As mentioned pre-
viously, probable cause requires that "the facts and circumstances within
their [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trust-
worthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that" an offense has been or is being
committed." The difference between traditional probable cause and the
Terry reasonable suspicion standard is that in order to have probable
cause, the likelihood of a crime being committed must be more likely
60. Winick, supra note 2, at 77.
61. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
62. Id. at 5-7.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 16-27.
66. Id. at 29-30.
67. Id. at 30-31.
68. Id. at 35 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The opinion of the Court disclaims the existence of
probable cause.' ").
69. Id. at 21 (majority opinion).
70. Id.
71. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
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than not,72 while under the Terry standard, all that is needed is a suspi-
cion that a crime is being committed, which is a lower standard than a
probability. Terry is perhaps the most controversial case in the realm of
probable cause dilution. As illustrated by Camara and Terry, the murki-
ness of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence extends into the realm of what
probable cause is, and whether it is even required in certain
circumstances.
C. Warrant Particularity and the Plain View Doctrine
The Fourth Amendment requires that warrants "particularly
describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized." 74 The purpose of the particularly requirement is to make sure
that "nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the war-
rant."7 In fact, the Supreme Court has gone as far as to explicitly dic-
tate that the Fourth Amendment exists because officers, although
perhaps well-meaning, may not have sufficient self-restraint to honor the
privacy of the citizenry.7 6 In Marron v. United States, the Court stated:
"The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to
be seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents
the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what
is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the
warrant."7 7
Additionally, the particularity requirement protects the citizen's pri-
vacy interests against "the wide ranging exploratory searches the Fram-
ers intended to prohibit."78  It prohibits law enforcement from seizing
one thing under a warrant describing a different item.7 9 In order to com-
ply with the particularity requirement, the warrant must describe the
place to be searched and the items to be seized in sufficient detail to
enable the executing officer to locate and identify it with reasonable
effort.o In sum, due to the Framers' dislike of general searches, the
72. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
73. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
74. US CONST. amend. IV.
75. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927).
76. See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1972) ("Fourth
Amendment freedoms cannot properly be guaranteed if domestic security surveillances may be
conducted solely within the discretion of the Executive Branch.").
77. Marron, 275 U.S. at 196.
78. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987).
79. Marron, 275 U.S. at 196.
80. United States v. Hargus, 128 F.3d 1358, 1362 ("[A] warrant's description of things to be
seized is sufficiently particular if it allows the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the
things authorized to be seized." (quoting United States v. Finnigin, 113 F.3d 1182, 1187 (10th Cir.
1997))).
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particularity requirement is meant to provide a judicial check on officer
discretion."
Although the courts have traditionally been concerned with officer
discretion, the plain view doctrine facilitates such discretion. The plain
view doctrine allows police officers to use evidence found while execut-
ing a warrant, even though the evidence is not within the warrant's
scope.82 To satisfy the plain view doctrine (1) the officer must not vio-
late the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the vantage point from which
he plainly views the evidence, (2) the object's incriminating nature must
be immediately apparent to the officer, and (3) the officer must have a
legal right of access to the object." One of the major issues is what the
definition of "immediately apparent" means in the second prong."
Early cases alluded to officer inadvertence as a requirement of the
plain view doctrine." In other words, the officer must have found the
evidence unintentionally."6 According to the Coolidge Court, inadver-
tence is essential to meet the rationale of the plain view exception
because "where the discovery [of evidence] is anticipated . . . . [t]he
requirement of a warrant to seize imposes no inconvenience whatever"
on the government." In other words, because the government subjec-
tively knows what they are looking for, there is no reason that they could
not attain a warrant." Although this logic is sound, a majority of the
Court did not join the inadvertence requirement view and the require-
ment is not binding precedent."
D. The Demise of Officer Inadvertence
Being that a majority did not join the inadvertence requirement and
it is not binding precedent, the Court subsequently held in Horton v.
California that "even though inadvertence is a characteristic of most
81. Garrison, 480 U.S. at 84 (the particularity requirement protects the citizen's privacy
interests against "the wide ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit.").
82. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plain view doctrine allows for
warrantless seizure).
83. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990).
84. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (serial numbers of suspected stolen stereo
were "immediately apparent" when the officer did not have to lift up the equipment to read them).
85. See, e.g., Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466 ("[T]he 'plain view' doctrine has been applied where
a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently
comes across an incriminating object."(emphasis added) (citing Harris v. United States, 390 U.S.
234 (1968))).
86. Id. at 469.
87. Id. at 470-71.
88. Id.
89. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 (1983) ("While the lower courts generally have
applied the Coolidge plurality's discussion of 'plain view,' it has never been expressly adopted by
a majority of this Court.").
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legitimate 'plain-view' seizures, it is not necessarily a condition."9 0 The
Court offered two reasons why the subjective intent of the officer should
not matter: (1) "evenhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the
application of objective standards of conduct" 9 1 and (2) the inadvertence
requirement is not necessary to prevent the police from converting war-
rants into general warrants "because that interest is 'already served by
the requirements that no warrant issue unless it 'particularly describ[es]
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.' "92
However, the Court's reasoning is flawed. As to the first reason
regarding police evenhandedness, the Constitution is not focused on
police evenhandedness, but rather the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.93 In other words, the Court is viewing the prob-
lem from the wrong perspective yet again. The Court is reasoning that
the inadvertence requirement will result in inconsistent police work and
therefore should be barred. However, the Constitution is not concerned
with consistent police work, but rather protecting citizens from the
police in general. 94
As to the second reason, the Court's reliance on the warrant being
particular is ironic. If an officer is allowed to intentionally deviate from
the particularity of the warrant itself, what good is the particularity any-
way? To illustrate, if a warrant reads that the police are allowed to
search a specified area for a gun it is technically particular. However, in
practice, if the officer sees the gun's handle exposed, but decides to
ignore that fact to search for any other contraband, how is this any dif-
ferent than a general search? The "particularity" of the warrant is not
particular in practice.
The Horton dissent correctly points out that "[i]n eschewing the
inadvertent discovery requirement, the majority ignores the Fourth
Amendment's express command that warrants particularly describe not
only the places to be searched, but also the things to be seized."9' To
illustrate, the dissent formulates a persuasive example:
For example, the warrant application process can often be time con-
suming, especially when the police attempt to seize a large number of
items. An officer interested in conducting a search as soon as possible
might decide to save time by listing only one or two hard-to-find
items, such as the stolen rings in this case, confident that he will find
in plain view all of the other evidence he is looking for before he
90. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 130 (1990).
91. Id. at 138.
92. Id. at 139.
93. Winick, supra note 2, at 77.
94. Winick, supra note 2, at 77.
95. Horton, 496 U.S. at 142 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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discovers the listed items. Because rings could be located almost any-
where inside or outside a house, it is unlikely that a warrant to search
for and seize the rings would restrict the scope of the search. An
officer might rationally find the risk of immediately discovering the
items listed in the warrant-thereby forcing him to conclude the
search immediately-outweighed by the time saved in the application
process.96
The dissent's hypothetical correctly illustrates the danger associated
with expelling the Coolidge inadvertence requirement to the plain view
doctrine.
In sum, the Court has slowly chipped away at Fourth Amendment
protections. The Court has created numerous exceptions to the warrant
requirements. The Court has changed the definition of probable cause
and even gone as far as eliminating it for certain searches. The Court
has manufactured the plain view doctrine and has even allowed officers
to blatantly testify that they ignored the limits of the warrant reasoning
that this leads to "even handed law enforcement."97 The Court's manip-
ulation of the Fourth Amendment, one of the most important protections
against government intrusion, has provided the landscape for the Carey
decision.
III. UNITED STATES V. CAREY
A. The Facts and Carey's Motion to Suppress
Patrick J. Carey was charged with one count of possessing a com-
puter hard drive that contained three or more images of child pornogra-
phy produced with materials shipped in interstate commerce in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B).9" Following a conditional plea of
guilty, he appealed an order of the district court denying his motion to
suppress contraband seized from his computer asserting that it was
seized as the result of a general, warrantless search.99
Defendant Carey had been under police surveillance for suspected
96. Id. at 146.
97. Id. at 139 (majority opinion).
98. The statute provides that "any person who . . . knowingly possesses, or knowingly
accesses with intent to view, any book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, computer disk, or
any other material that contains an image of child pornography that has been mailed, or shipped or
transported using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting
interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, or that was produced using
materials that have been mailed, or shipped or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce by any means, including by computer; shall be punished as provided in subsection (b)"
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (1994 & Supp. 1996) (1998 modification by removing "three or more
images" and replacing "an image").
99. United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir. 1999).
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sale and possession of cocaine. 00 Undercover agents had executed con-
trolled buys at Carey's residence, and six weeks after the last purchase,
police obtained an arrest warrant.' 1 During the course of the arrest,
officers observed in plain view a "bong," which is used to smoke mari-
juana, and what appeared to be marijuana in defendant's apartment.10 2
The officer then asked Carey for consent to search his apartment
for more contraband. 103 The officer informed Carey that if Carey
declined to consent, the officer would get a search warrant."' After
much discussion with the officer, Carey verbally consented to the search
and subsequently signed a formal consent form at the police station. 0 5
Carey was concerned that officers would "trash" his apartment so Carey
gave them instructions on how to find narcotic related contraband. 106
The written consent form authorized Sergeant William Reece "to
have conducted a complete search of the premises and property located
at 3225 Canterbury # 10, Manhattan, KS 66503."o107 It further pro-
vided, "I do freely and voluntarily consent and agree that any property
under my control ... may be removed by the officers .. . if said property
shall be essential in the proof of the commission of any crime in viola-
tion of the Laws of the United States . . . "los With this consent,
police returned to Carey's apartment that night and found cocaine, mari-
juana, and hallucinogenic mushrooms.109 Additionally, the officer con-
fiscated two computers believing that they will be subject to forfeiture or
that they would contain evidence of drug dealing.'1 o
The officers took the computers to the police station and obtained a
warrant, which allowed the officers to search files on the computers for
"names, telephone numbers, ledger receipts, addresses, and other docu-
mentary evidence pertaining to the sale and distribution of controlled
substances.""' Detective Lewis and a computer technician searched the
computer by viewing the computer hard drives.' 12 They downloaded
directories onto floppy disks and subsequently printed them.' 3 Among
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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the directories were numerous files labeled "JPG"H4 with sexually sug-
gestive titles."l5 Lewis inserted the disks into another computer and
began searching the files from Carey's computers." 6 Lewis searched by
entering key words such as, "money, accounts, people, so forth" to find
"text-based" files that contained these words.'" This search did not pro-
duce any files related to drugs.""
Although the search did not produce any files related to drugs,
Detective Lewis continued to search the directories and came across
some files that he "was not familiar with."" 9 He was unable to view
these files on the computer he was using so he downloaded them to a
disk and viewed them on another computer.' 20 He then was "immedi-
ately" able to view what he later described as a "JPG file." 12' When he
opened the file he discovered that it contained child pornography.122
Lewis downloaded approximately two hundred and forty-four
image files .123 These files were transferred to nineteen disks, and only
portions of the disks were viewed to determine that they contained child
pornography.124 Even though none of the disks were viewed in their
entirety to determine whether or not they contained child pornography,
Lewis looked at approximately "five to seven" files on each disk.125
After viewing the contents of the nineteen disks, he returned to Carey's
computers to continue his original task of looking for evidence of drug
dealing. 126
Carey moved to suppress the JPG files containing child pornogra-
phy.m2 During the hearing, Lewis stated that although the JPG file dis-
covery was inadvertent, when he saw the first picture containing child
pornography, he developed probable cause to believe the same kind of
material was present on the other image files.128 Lewis was then asked
114. Id. at 1271 n.2 ("Detective Lewis later testified at the time he discovered the first JPG or
image file, he did not know what it was nor had he ever experienced an occasion in which the
label 'JPG' was used by drug dealers to disguise text files. He stated, however, image files could
contain evidence pertinent to a drug investigation such as pictures of 'a hydroponic growth system
and how it's set up to operate.').
115. Id. at 1270.
116. Id. at 1271.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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why he did not obtain a search warrant and his response was "that ques-
tion did arise, [a]nd my captain took care of that through the county
attorney's office."l 29 Although no warrant was obtained, the officer
continued the search because he believed that he "had to search these
files as well as any other files contained [in the computer].""1o
The officer subsequently changed his story when he was questioned
by the government. '3 1 Lewis stated that he did not know the file con-
tents until he actually opened each file.132 In other words, he said that
he did not believe he was required to have a search warrant to open each
JPG file. 133 However, after viewing a copy of the hard disk directory,
Lewis admitted there was a "phalanx"1 34 of JPG files listed on the hard
drive's directory.135 He nevertheless claimed that he "wasn't conducting
a search for child pornography, that happened to be what these turned
out to be."136 The Court denied the motion without any findings stating:
"[a]t this point, the Court feels that the. . .Defendant's Motion to Sup-
press. . .would be-should be denied. And that will be the order of the
Court, realizing that they are close questions."137
On appeal, Carey asserted that the computer searches transformed
the warrant into a "general warrant" and resulted in an illegal search of
his computer files.' 3 8 He asserted that despite the specificity of the
search warrant, the police opened files not pertaining to the sale or dis-
tribution of drugs and that the files should be suppressed.'39 The gov-
ernment responded that the plain view doctrine authorized the police
search and they analogized a computer search to searching a file cabinet
for documents and finding child pomography. 4 0 The Carey Court sided
with the defendant and reversed the lower court's ruling.14'
B. Holding and Rationale
The Carey court held that the search was beyond the scope of the
warrant when the officer began searching the JPG files with the intent of
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1271 n.3 (The JPG files on the directory had sexually explicit names, many
containing the word "young" or "teen." The detective testified that drug dealers often use various
tactics to conceal drug dealing evidence).
136. Id. at 1271.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1271-72.
139. Id. at 1272.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1276.
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discovering evidence of child pornography. 4 2 The court dispelled the
government's filing cabinet analogy by distinguishing computers from
filing cabinets.14 3 The court stated that because computers have the
potential to store vast quantities of information, they are tempting targets
for search, making a file cabinet analogy overly simplistic. * As such,
the court reasoned that after the officer discovered the first image of
child pornography, the proper recourse should have been to postpone the
search and obtain a warrant to continue searching for child
pornography.14 5
The court emphasized that the officer's intent played a role in the
decision.' The court articulated that "the plain view doctrine may not
be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to
another until something incriminating at last emerges.""' The Court
determined that the officer turned the specific search for evidence of
drug trafficking into a general search because
In his own words . . . his [the officer's] suspicions changed
immediately upon opening the first JPG file. After viewing the con-
tents of the first file, he then had "probable cause" to believe the
remaining JPG files contained similar erotic material. Thus, because
of the officer's own admission, it is plainly evident each time he
opened a subsequent JPG file, he expected to find child pornography
and not material related to drugs. Armed with this knowledge, he still
continued to open every JPG file to confirm his expectations. Under
these circumstances, we cannot say the contents of each of those files
were inadvertently discovered. Moreover, Detective Lewis made
clear as he opened each of the JPG files he was not looking for evi-
dence of drug trafficking. He had temporarily abandoned that search
to look for more child pornography, and only "went back" to search-
ing for drug-related documents after conducting a five hour search of
the child pornography files.' 4 8
The Carey court explained that one of the operative facts was that each
of the files labeled "JPG" featured sexually explicit titles.14 9 This titling
was important because after the officer opened the first file with the
142. Id. at 1272-74.
143. Id. at 1275 ("[B]ecause this case involves images stored in a computer, the file cabinet
analogy may be inadequate.").
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1275-76.
146. Id. at 1275 ("Even if we employ the file cabinet theory, the testimony of Detective Lewis
makes the analogy inapposite because he stated he knew, or at least had probable cause to know,
each drawer was properly labeled and its contents were clearly described in the label.") (emphasis
added).
147. Id. (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971)).
148. Carey, 172 F.3d at 1273.
149. Id. at 1274.
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sexually explicit label and found child pornography, the officer knew
what the titles meant - sexually explicit material.' Thus, when he sub-
sequently opened more files, he knew that he was not going to find items
related to drug activity.'"' As such, the Court determined that the
officer's intent was to expand the specific warrant into a general one.
In response to the court's decision, the government filed a petition
for rehearing.152 The court denied the petition and stated as follows:
Because the government contends we failed to properly follow Hor-
ton v. California, we recognize inadvertance is not a Fourth Amend-
ment requirement. We note, however, "inadvertance is a
characteristic of most legitimate 'plain-view' seizures." As such, the
fact that Detective Lewis did not inadvertently come across the por-
nographic files is certainly relevant to our inquiry. Our holding is
based, however, on the fact that Detective Lewis impermissibly
expanded the scope of his search when he abandoned the search for
drug-related evidence to search for evidence of child pornography.
The petition for rehearing is denied.' 53
Recognizing that the facts in this case involved a "close call," the court
explicitly limited the holding to the facts of the case: "[W]e are quick to
note these results are predicated only upon the particular facts of this
case, and a search of computer files based on different facts might pro-
duce a different result."15 4
IV. CRITICISMS AND APPLYING CAREY
A. Response to Criticisms of the Carey Decision
Critics claim that the Carey decision is contrary to both Supreme
Court and Tenth Circuit precedent.' Particularly, critics assert that
Carey is in conflict with the Supreme Court decision in Horton v. Cali-
fornia, and the Tenth Circuit decision in United States v. Botero-
Ospina.15 6 However, Carey is distinguishable from these cases.
In Horton, the police were investigating an armed robbery. 15  Dur-
ing their investigation, the police sought a search warrant to search the
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1277-78.
153. Id. (citations omitted).
154. Id. at 1276.
155. Jim Dowell, Criminal Procedure: Tenth Circuit Erroneously Allows Officers' Intentions
to Define Reasonable Searches: United States v. Carey, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 665, 676 (2001)
("[The] holding in Carey is clearly contrary to both Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit
precedent.").
156. Id. at n.96.
157. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 130-31 (1990).
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petitioner's home.' 58 Although the officer's affidavit for the search war-
rant referred to police reports that mentioned weapons and proceeds, the
Magistrate only authorized a search for proceeds from the robbery.' 59
Specifically, some of the items stolen were distinct rings. 6 o Pursuant to
the warrant, officers searched the petitioner's residence, but they did not
find the stolen property. 161 However, officers discovered the weapons
used in the robbery in plain view and seized them.'62 The officer admit-
ted that he intentionally searched for evidence other than the rings that
would link the petitioner to the crime. 16 Thus, the officer's weapon
discovery was not "inadvertent." 64 The Horton Court determined that
inadvertence was not a prerequisite to the plain view seizure and
affirmed the lower court's conviction.16 5
In United States v. Botero-Ospina,16 6 a police officer pulled over
the petitioner for allegedly swerving on the highway.16 7 The deputy
asked the petitioner for his driver's license and registration.16' The dep-
uty discovered that the vehicle was registered in New Jersey to another
man.169 The deputy then questioned the petitioner on where he had been
and the petitioner said that he was coming from "Garfield," a town that
the officer had never heard of before.' 0 The officer then asked the peti-
tioner for permission to search the vehicle and the petitioner said
"sure.""' The officer then discovered drugs in the vehicle and placed
the petitioner under arrest.' 7 2 The petitioner moved to suppress the
cocaine arguing that the stop was unconstitutional because it was pretex-
tual.'" The Court denied the motion stating that the officer's subjective
motives were irrelevant and the stop was proper as long as the officer
had objective criteria for pulling over the vehicle.
Carey is distinguishable from Horton because searching a home is
distinct from searching a computer. The main difference between a
158. Id.
159. Id. at 131.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 142.
166. 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 785.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 787.
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computer and a home is that a computer can hold enormous amounts of
data. 7 1 People use computers to store almost everything imaginable
including images, movies, documents, emails and personal records in
quantities that surpass what a home may hold. 176 In essence, in today's
age, a search of someone's computer is in turn a search of their entire
life. Because of this difference, computer searches require a different
Fourth Amendment analysis.' 7  Thus, because Carey involved a com-
puter search, Carey's facts are distinguishable from Horton and the two
cases are not in direct conflict.
Carey is also distinguishable from Botero-Ospina. The issue in
Botero-Ospina was not whether the search was constitutional, but rather
whether the stop was constitutional."1 7  In fact, the petitioner consented
to the search of the vehicle, and the search's constitutionality was never
at issue.917  Although both Carey and Botero-Ospina question whether
an officer's subjective intent is relevant, the differences between
searches and seizures distinguish the two cases. For instance, in order
for an officer to stop a vehicle, or seize it, all that the officer needs is a
"reasonable suspicion" that the vehicle is violating traffic laws.180 How-
ever, this lower standard does not apply to the searching of someone's
dwelling or computer because warrants are required, which require prob-
able cause." In essence, although Botero-Ospina determines whether
an officer's subjective intent is relevant, the fact that it involves a
seizure as opposed to a search is distinguishable from the Carey facts
and the two cases are not in conflict.
Aside from the Carey decision not following precedent, critics also
claim that Carey's officer inadvertence requirement poses a danger to
the criminal justice system as a whole.182 Particularly, critics claim that
a subjective analysis (1) provides officers with an incentive to lie and (2)
rewards law enforcement for using untrained officers.18 3 However,
many empirical studies illustrate that officer perjury is common, espe-
cially when officers are trying to avoid suppression of evidence.' 84 As
one scholar articulated:
175. See RayMing Chang, Why the Plain View Doctrine Should not Apply to Digital Evidence,
12 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & App. ADVOC. 31, 35 (2007).
176. Id.
177. See Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REv. 531
(2005).
178. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d at 785.
179. Id.
180. See id.
181. US CONST. amend. IV.
182. Dowell, supra note 155, at 676.
183. Id.
184. See Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43 EMORY L.J. 1311, 1312 (1994).
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Police officers can be expected to omit, redact, and even lie on
their police reports, sworn or unsworn; they will conceal or misrepre-
sent to cover up corruption and brutality; they are trained to deceive
citizens during investigations as part of good police practice; they
will obscure facts, and even lie, to cover up the misconduct of fellow
officers. Additionally, command practice and policy gives officers
every incentive to lie to cover for lack of productivity or to aggran-
dize themselves for recognition and promotion. And yes, police
officers will commit perjury in our courts of law.18 5
In other words, the Carey decision provides no additional incentive to
fabricate; rather it provides another opportunity to do so. But doesn't
every constitutional protection provide government officials with oppor-
tunities to lie?'8 1 In other words, whenever an officer testifies on behalf
of the prosecution the officer both has an incentive and opportunity to
frame the facts in their favor. At times their jobs may depend on it."'
Critics concede that officers may have incentives to lie about objec-
tive facts as well. However, the critics claim that lies about objective
facts "can often be independently verified or disproved, whereas an
officer's subjective intent or expectations cannot be proven unless the
officer has communicated those thoughts to another individual who is
willing to testify."18 8 The critic's solution seems to allow officers to
blatantly testify that they intentionally ignored the confines of a warrant.
Although this testimony would not be a fabrication, is the citizenry bet-
ter off? Perhaps the more reasonable approach would be to have the
officer cross-examined concerning his subjective intent and let the fact
finder decide whether or not he intended to deviate from the warrant's
authority.
Critics also claim that the Carey decision awards law enforcement
for using untrained officers:
An untrained officer might not know that certain types of evidence
will usually only be found in certain types of computer files. The
officer can then truthfully testify that he intended to search for and
expected to find that evidence every time he opened a computer file.
Even if a reasonable person would have known that the evidence
could not be found in the files the officer searched, a court relying on
the searching officer's subjective intent or expectations might find
185. David N. Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 Am. J. CRIM. L.
455, 460-61 (1999).
186. Id. at 461 ([L]ies under oath . . . often involv[e] the tailoring of testimony to meet
constitutional requirements).
187. Id. at 461 ("[C]ommand practice and policy gives officers every incentive to lie to cover
for lack of productivity or to aggrandize themselves for recognition and promotion.").
188. Dowell, supra note 155, at 676.
2012] 491
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the evidence admissible because the officer's intent was proper. 89
This argument assumes that law enforcement would rather use an inex-
perienced officer to stumble through a complex search all to avoid
obtaining a warrant. However, obtaining a warrant is not the time con-
suming inconvenience it once was.190 Specifically, in 1977 Congress
amended Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in order to
allow magistrates to issue warrants over the telephone.19' The purpose
of the amendment was to expedite the issuance process in order to cur-
tail warrantless searches.1 92
Under the rule, to obtain a search warrant, officers simply tele-
phones a magistrate and then writes out their own "duplicate original
warrant" describing the circumstances of the time and place and why the
officer believes that there is probable cause.193 The officer then reads
the duplicate original warrant verbatim, and under oath, into the tele-
phone and the magistrate records the conversation.194 If the magistrate
determines that the facts and circumstances amount to probable cause,
then the officer signs the original duplicate warrant and the warrant is
considered issued.'9 The San Diego District Attorney's Office esti-
mated that ninety-five percent of telephonic warrant requests were
processed in less than forty-five minutes.' 96
In Carey, Detective Lewis communicated warrant concerns to his
captain.197 In light of Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, an officer in a similar situation can simply "phone a friend" and
have a warrant issued likely in less than forty-five minutes.' With this
expedited process, it is highly unlikely that law enforcement will pur-
posefully hire an incompetent officer in order to comply with the Carey
inadvertence requirement. As such, the critic's argument is flawed.
B. Why the Carey Inadvertence Requirement Should Apply to
Plain View Computer Searches
Because computer files can be anywhere on a computer, computer
189. Id.
190. See Justin H. Smith, Press One for Warrant: Reinventing the Fourth Amendment's Search
Warrant Requirement Through Electronic Procedures, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1591, 1606-14 (2002).
191. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2) (1977).
192. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2), Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1977 Amendment,
reprinted in 19 U.S.C. App., at 1672-73, 1674 (Supp. III 1979) (citations omitted).
193. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2)(B) (1977).
194. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2)(D) (1977).
195. Id.
196. Bryan D. Lane, Telephonic Search Warrants Under the Oregon Constitution: A call for
the Limitation of Exigent Circumstances, 24 WILLAMETE L. REV. 967, 982 (1988).
197. United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 1999).
198. Lane, supra note 196, at 982.
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searches call for officer inadvertence as a plain view doctrine require-
ment. Under the plain view doctrine, a police officer may search any
area where the items listed on the warrant may reasonably be.' 9 9 In
other words, if the warrant allows for search of a shot gun, the officers
may not open a cabinet that cannot physically contain a shot gun. How-
ever, with a computer search, officers are simply looking for files. Files
can be anywhere on a computer.20 0 This in turn creates a general search
of the entire computer.20 1 In essence, not having officer inadvertence in
plain view computer cases will in fact result in a general search of virtu-
ally everything a person owns. This is very distinct from a home
because under the traditional plain view doctrine a home is more likely
to have limits to a search. In the shot gun hypothetical the cupboard will
be off limits. This allows the warrant to retain some particularity. In
cases similar to Carey, finding evidence of drug distribution on a com-
puter opens up the entire computer to the search, thus resulting in a
general search. The Carey inadvertence requirement will curtail this
concern.
Some scholars have argued that in light of computer searches the
plain view doctrine should simply be abolished.20 2 Although abolishing
the plain view doctrine will solve the problems associated with computer
searches, it is a radical step. The plain view doctrine does serve a pur-
pose. The Court in Coolidge aptly stated as follows:
Where, once an otherwise lawful search is in progress, the police
inadvertently come upon a piece of evidence, it would often be a
needless inconvenience, and sometimes dangerous-to the evidence or
to the police themselves-to require them to ignore it until they have
obtained a warrant particularly describing it.203
In other words, when officers simply "stumble" upon evidence while
conducting a legal search, it seems preposterous for them not to seize it.
Instead of abolishing the plain view doctrine in computer searches, the
more prudent course of action would simply be to curtail its scope.
Applying Carey's officer inadvertence requirement to computer
searches will accomplish this goal without completely eliminating the
plain view doctrine in the realm of computers. Applying Carey is a
preferable alternative to eliminating the plain view doctrine altogether
and it will keep Fourth Amendment jurisprudence somewhat
199. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 146 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (because rings
may be found anywhere in a house, it allows for search of the entire house).
200. Kerr, supra note 177, at 35.
201. United States v. Payton 573 F. 3d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 2009).
202. Kerr, supra note 177, 577-78.
203. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467-68 (1971).
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consistent. 20
Additionally, applying the Carey standard specifically to the com-
puter realm will minimally impact the underlying concerns that fueled
Horton. As mentioned in Part II, Horton dispelled officer inadvertence
for the sake of "police evenhandedness."2 0 5 If Carey is applied exclu-
sively to the computer realm, the impact will only be in one very spe-
cific area of searches. In other words, every other type of search (car,
dwelling, etc. . .) will still be subject to the objective analysis resulting
in a minimal impact on police evenhandedness. On the other hand, the
increase in citizenry protection will be great. The risk of transmuting a
particularized computer search into a general one will be reduced tre-
mendously. In Carey, for instance, the officer would have had to obtain
a warrant after he realized that the first file contained child pornography.
The second warrant would have permitted officers to search the com-
puter for child pornography resulting in a particular warrant in compli-
ance with Fourth Amendment requirements.
In essence, the Carey doctrine should be seen as a type of "excep-
tion" to the plain view exception. As mentioned in Part II, the Court has
no problem carving exceptions regarding Fourth Amendment require-
ments. The Court has enacted numerous exceptions including excep-
tions to warrant requirements, and even exceptions as to what probable
cause is and when it is required.2 06 There is no reason why the Court
cannot carve an exception to the plain view doctrine when computers are
concerned. The only difference in requiring officer inadvertence in
computer searches is that this exception will be in favor of protections,
not at the expense of them.
V. CONCLUSION
The Carey court recognized the unique dangers associated with
computer searches. The court determined that existing reasoning did not
serve the Fourth Amendment adequately while implicitly recognizing
that computers require additional Fourth Amendment protections.
Although the Framers could not have anticipated such a change in tech-
nology, the Carey decision accurately depicts the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment: to protect the citizenry from unreasonable searches and
seizures. The Supreme Court should follow the Carey decision and put
a stop to the Fourth Amendment's deterioration.
204. A difficult task to say the least.
205. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 128 (1990).
206. See Part II.
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